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While much has been written about the potential benefits of mentoring in academia, very little research
documents its effectiveness. We present data from a randomized controlled trial of a mentoring program
for female economists organized by the Committee for the Status of Women in the Economics Profession
and sponsored by the National Science Foundation and the American Economics Association.  To
our knowledge, this is the first randomized trial of a mentoring program in academia.  We evaluate
the performance of three cohorts of participants and randomly-assigned controls from 2004, 2006,
and 2008.  This paper presents an interim assessment of the program’s effects.  Our results suggest
that mentoring works.  After five years the 2004 treatment group averaged .4 more NSF or NIH grants
and 3 additional publications, and were 25 percentage points more likely to have a top-tier publication.
There are significant but smaller effects at three years post-treatment for the 2004 and 2006 cohorts
combined. While it is too early to assess the ultimate effects of mentoring on the academic careers
of program participants, the results suggest that this type of mentoring may be one way to help women
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Since its inception in 1971, the American Economic Association (AEA) Committee on 
the Status of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP) has tracked the number of women 
at various ranks in the profession.  CSWEP’s statistics indicate a “leaky pipeline” from PhD 
programs into tenured academic jobs.  The significant under-representation of women in 
economics at the tenured level prompted CSWEP to establish the CSWEP Mentoring Program 
(CeMENT) with the support of the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) ADVANCE program 
and the AEA.  The program is aimed at assisting female junior faculty to prepare themselves for 
the tenure hurdle.   
We are evaluating the success of the program using a randomized trial.  Applicants were 
randomly assigned to be treatments (mentees who attended the workshop) or controls who did 
not participate.  Our study will compare the academic performance (i.e., papers, grants) of these 
two groups.  To our knowledge, this randomized trial of a mentoring program is unique in 
academia.
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There have now been three cohorts of program participants, in 2004, 2006, and 2008.  A 
fourth cohort will begin in January 2010 and another is planned for January 2012.  This paper 
thus presents an interim assessment.  We find that CeMENT significantly increased publication 
rates and successful grant applications.  While it is too early to tell what the eventual effect on 
tenure will be, the results suggest that this program may be a useful way to help women advance 
in the economics profession.   
I. Background 
                                                 
1An earlier, one-shot, CSWEP mentoring effort was offered and evaluated in 1998, but did not 
use random assignment.  See Robin Bartlett and Andrea Ziegert (2000).    Using data from the 1973-2001 Survey of Doctoral Recipients, Donna K. Ginther and 
Shulamit Kahn (2004) find gender differences in promotion to tenure in economics of 21 
percentage points.  A separate analysis of a sample of AEA members that controls for 
publications and citations finds a 14 percentage point gender gap in the probability of promotion 
to tenure.  Moreover, they show that women are significantly less likely to be promoted in 
economics than in political science, statistics, life science, physical science and engineering. 
John M. McDowell, Larry D. Singell and Mark Slater (2006) suggest that one possible cause of 
women’s failure to advance in economics may be a lack of research networks.  As one indicator 
of limited networks, they find that while co-authorship is common in economics, female 
economists are less likely to coauthor than their male colleagues, even after controlling for 
publication rates.  Francine Blau, Marianne Ferber and Anne Winkler (2010) suggest a second 
possible cause, a lack of role models and informal relationships between young academics and 
those who are more senior.   
II. The CeMENT Intervention 
The national CeMENT workshops were designed to expose participants to role models 
(senior female economists), to transmit information about what it takes to get tenure, and to build 
peer networks of female junior faculty working in similar research areas.  Each workshop lasted 
two days, and was held in conjunction with the American Economic Association annual 
meetings.  The workshops brought together junior and senior faculty mentors from various 
institutions, arranged into small groups (4-5 participants and 1-2 mentors) based on research 
interests.  The workshops were widely advertised and aimed at faculty in research departments.
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2CSWEP also ran “regional” workshops associated with the meetings of regional economics 
associations.  These workshops, organized by KimMarie McGoldrick were aimed at faculty in 
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 Each participant circulated a research paper or other related work (like a grant proposal) 
before the workshop.  During the workshop, the small groups met to discuss and provide 
feedback on each participant's work (approximately one hour for each participant).  In addition to 
the small group meetings, plenary sessions were held consisting of panels of the senior mentors.  
Topics included research and publishing, getting grants, professional exposure, teaching, the 
tenure process and work-life balance.  At the end of each workshop an exit survey was 
distributed.  On a scale of 1-7, where 1 is “not at all helpful” and 7 is “extremely helpful,” the 
average rating of the workshop over all three years was 6.63.  Anecdotal evidence based on 
discussions with former participants suggests that many women stayed in touch with other 
women whom they met through the program, and that these women became an important support 
network. 
More than 80 people applied for each workshop.  After eliminating incomplete or 
inappropriate applications, applicants were divided into groups by research area.  Applicants 
were then randomly assigned to treatment or control status within each group.  We selected more 
treatments than controls in an effort to maximize access to the program.  For example, in a group 
of eight, we would select five to be treatments and three to be controls.  Both controls and 
participants were told that we had received more applicants than we could accommodate, and 
that we had randomly selected participants from the pool of eligible applicants.   
This interim evaluation focuses on information that has been systematically coded from 
vitae of participants and controls.  These vitae were either obtained directly from the individual 
or downloaded from the web.  If no current vita was available (as of the follow-up date), we 
                                                                                                                                                             
teaching institutions, and were not evaluated using random assignment.  
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 searched public data bases for published articles and federal grants in order to update these 
outcomes.  Most people who were missing recent vitas had left the tenure track. 
  Table 1:  Pre-treatment Means 
 Treatment  Control 









Any Children  0.240*  0.144 




PhD At Top 10  0.357  0.308 
Intends To Be In 
Academia In 10 
Years 
0.924* 0.978 
Has Mentor  0.659  0.567 































III. Interim Results 
We have data after one year for all three 
workshops; after three years for 2004 and 2006; 
and after five years for 2004.  Table 1 shows a 
comparison of selected “pre-intervention” 
characteristics of treatments and controls based 
on information submitted as part of the initial 
applications for the workshops.   
On average, applicants were about three 
years from their PhDs.  Fewer than half were 
U.S. citizens.  However, most applicants 
obtained the PhD in a U.S. school, and the 
majority were employed by U.S. institutions.
3  
A little over half were married or living with a 
partner, and about a fifth had children.  Overall, 
treatments were significantly more likely to 
have children; this was driven by treatments in 
                                                 
3In order to be included in the pool eligible for random assignment, the applicant needed to have 
a North American PhD or be employed at a North American research institution. 
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 cohort 2 (the 2006 workshop) who were also significantly older.  92.4 percent of the treatments 
and 97.8 percent of the controls planned to be in academia 10 years from the time of their initial 
application.  Most of the applicants were in academic jobs, and 75% were in PhD granting 
institutions.   
Table 1 indicates that there are no significant differences in number of grants or total 
number of publications before the workshops.  However, we do find that treatments were 
significantly more likely to hold a job at a top 10 department
4 and to have a publication in a top-
tier journal.
5  The estimates by cohort show that these differences arose in cohort 2, where, by 
unfortunate chance, all of the applicants from top 10 departments were selected for the treatment.  
Treatments in cohort 2 had more publications and were significantly more likely to have a 
publication in a top-tier journal.  We therefore present our results by cohort, as well as for the 
pooled cohorts. 
Table 2 shows our main results.  Each entry in the table is a coefficient from a separate 
regression of an outcome (indicated by the column heading) on a constant and an indicator for 
whether or not the woman was in the “treatment” group.  The first four rows suggest that one 
year after the treatment, the program had had little impact, as one would expect given delays in 
                                                 
4We defined department rank using Pantelis Kalaitzidakis, Theofanis P. Mamuneas, and 
Thanasis Stengos (2003) because it included non-North American schools.  The top 10 
departments were Harvard University, University of Chicago, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Northwestern University, University of Pennsylvania, Yale University, Princeton 
University, Stanford University, University of California at Berkeley, and New York University.  
5We defined the top-tier journals as the American Economic Review, the Journal of Political 
Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Econometrica.   
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 grant writing and publications.  The main exception is the second cohort treatments who were 
also more likely to have top-tier publications and more publications pre-treatment.  
The next three rows 
suggest that the intervention had 
a positive effect on publications 
in both Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 
after three years.  Since there 
was no pre-treatment difference 
in publications in Cohort 1, this 
result is encouraging.  The 
estimates suggest that by three 
years after the intervention, 
workshop participants were 20 
percentage points more likely to 
have a top-tier publication, and 
had two more publications than 
controls.  There is also a positive effect on successful grants in the pooled cohorts.  
















0.069 0.109** 0.583 
(0.084) (0.039) (0.652) 
Cohort 1 0.179 0.067 1.099 
(0.166) (0.074) (0.834) 
Cohort 2 0.117 0.194**  1.994* 
(0.112) (0.067) (1.024) 
Cohort 3 -0.104 0.074 -1.378 
(0.141) (0.060) (1.473) 




1 & 2 
0.227* 0.195**  1.850** 
(0.125) (0.058) (0.861) 
Cohort 1 0.320 0.171*  2.039* 
(0.210) (0.088) (1.145) 
Cohort 2 0.117 0.222** 1.628 
(0.112) (0.070) (1.312) 





0.398* 0.252**  2.959** 
(0.241) (0.103) (1.472) 
aEstimated treatment effect from a regression of outcome on treatment 
and a dummy variable for each cohort (where applicable).  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  There are 79, 66, and 72 observations in 
cohorts one, two and three, respectively.  *p<.10; **p<.05 
Finally, the last row shows the results after five years for Cohort 1.  We see positive and 
significant effects of the workshop on grants, top-tier publication and total publications.  Those 
in the treatment group had .4 more NSF or NIH grants on average.  They had 3 additional 
publications, and were 25 percentage points more likely to have a top tier publication.  These 
results are especially persuasive in that there were no significant pre-treatment differences in 
outcomes for this cohort.  
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Given the evidence in 
Table 1, we have conducted a 
number of additional analyses to 
explore whether the estimated 
treatment effects in Table 2 are 
driven by pre-existing 
differences between treatments 
and controls.  Table 3 shows 
estimates similar to those in 
Table 2, except that the models 
included controls for having a 
pre-treatment job at a top 10 
department and for the number 
of pre-treatment publications in 
top-tier journals.  Adding these controls reduces the estimated effects somewhat, and there are no 
longer significant effects on grant activity, although all of the year 3 and year 5 estimates remain 
positive.  We still find, however, that at year 5, treatments are 20 percentage points more likely 
to have a top-tier publication and have 2.7 more publications overall, compared to controls; at 
year 3, the comparable figures are 9 percentage points and 1.6 publications. 
Table 3: Coefficients on Treatment for Regressions of 















0.054 0.023 0.478 
(0.088) (0.025) (0.674) 
Cohort 1 0.151 0.011 1.032 
(0.176) (0.053) (0.844) 
Cohort 2 0.126 0.024* 1.898 
(0.116) (0.013) (1.205) 
Cohort 3 -0.117 0.011 -1.480 
(0.143) (0.050) (1.500) 




1 & 2 
0.179 0.090*  1.622* 
(0.136) (0.046) (0.890) 
Cohort 1 0.256 0.112 1.843 
(0.221) (0.078) (1.124) 
Cohort 2 0.126 0.058 1.414 
(0.116) (0.037) (1.484) 





0.314 0.200**  2.677* 
(0.246) (0.097) (1.461) 
aEstimated treatment effect from a regression of outcome on treatment, 
total pre-treatment top-tier publications, having a job at a top-10 school at 
pre-treatment, and a dummy variable for each cohort (where applicable).  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p<.10; **p<.05 
Table 4 asks whether changes in outcomes between the pre-intervention and a later date 
are affected by the intervention.  These models are equivalent to including person-specific fixed 
effects (since the difference in intervention status between time t and time 0 is always 1 or 0).   
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 The year 1 results show 
that this specification effectively 
controls for the larger number of 
top-tier publications in Cohort 2 
at baseline.  At year 5, we 
continue to see significant gains 
in grants and publications for 
treatments:  Treatments were 27 
percentage points more likely to 
have an NSF or NIH grant, 23 
percentage points more likely to 
have any top-tier publication, 
and they have 2.4 more 
publications overall.  For cohort 
1, there are also significant (but 
smaller) effects on both 
outcomes at year 3, and effects that are smaller still in year 1.  It is conceivable that the 
differences at year 3 and year 5 could reflect pre-existing differences in trajectories between 
treatment and control members.  However, the much smaller effects of the treatment on grants 
and top-tier publications after one year provides some evidence that the treatments were not 
simply on a better trajectory to start.  Models excluding applicants with PhDs from top 10 
departments, and models excluding applicants with first jobs at top 10 departments produce 
similar results. 
Table 4: Coefficients on Treatment from Regressions of 

















0.039 0.016  0.308** 
(0.037) (0.023) (0.153) 
Cohort 1 0.045 0.037  0.531* 
(0.078) (0.048) (0.275) 
Cohort 2 0.072 - 0.361 
(0.075) - (0.275) 
Cohort 3 - 0.007  0.000 
- (0.048)  (0.238) 




1 & 2 
0.134* 0.089**  0.795 
(0.075) (0.042) (0.481) 
Cohort 1 0.186 0.141*  1.471** 
(0.122) (0.073) (0.670) 
Cohort 2 0.072 0.028 -0.006 
(0.075) (0.028) (0.682) 





0.265* 0.226**  2.387** 
(0.158) (0.091) (1.055) 
aEstimated treatment effect from a regression of the change in outcomes 
between pre-treatment and the given year on treatment and a dummy 
variable for each cohort (where applicable).  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The missing estimates correspond to outcomes that do not 
change between pre-treatment and the one-year follow up.  
*p<.10; **p<.05. 
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 IV. Conclusions 
We find that CeMENT increased top-tier publications, the total number of publications, 
and the total number of successful federal grants in treated women relative to controls.  The 
effects are monotonic with respect to time from the intervention and robust to several 
specification checks designed to control for possible pre-existing differences between treatments 
and controls.  These results are encouraging in that publications and grants are important 
predictors of tenure at most research institutions, and suggest that the intervention had a positive 
influence on academic productivity.  Nonetheless, it is too early to say whether the intervention 
will have a significant effect on either the probability that women stay in academia, or the 
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